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Abstract—To slow down the spread of COVID-19, governments
around the world are trying to identify infected people and
to contain the virus by enforcing isolation and quarantine.
However, it is difficult to trace people who came into contact
with an infected person, which causes widespread community
transmission and mass infection. To address this problem, we
develop an e-government Privacy Preserving Mobile and Fog
computing framework entitled PPMF that can trace infected
and suspected cases nationwide. We use personal mobile devices
with contact tracing app and two types of stationary fog nodes,
named Automatic Risk Checkers (ARC) and Suspected User
Data Uploader Node (SUDUN), to trace community transmission
alongside maintaining user data privacy. Each user’s mobile
device receives a Unique Encrypted Reference Code (UERC)
when registering on the central application. The mobile device
and the central application both generate Rotational Unique En-
crypted Reference Code (RUERC), which broadcasted using the
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology. The ARCs are placed
at the entry points of buildings, which can immediately detect if
there are positive or suspected cases nearby. If any confirmed case
is found, the ARCs broadcast pre-cautionary messages to nearby
people without revealing the identity of the infected person. The
SUDUNs are placed at the health centers that report test result to
the central cloud application. The reported data is later used to
map between infected and suspected cases. Therefore, using our
proposed PPMF framework, governments can let organizations
continue their economic activities without complete lockdown.
Index Terms—COVID-19, Community Transmission, Contact
Tracing, Mobile App, Data Privacy, Fog Computing
I. INTRODUCTION
THE novel corona virus disease in 2019 (COVID-19)has spread rapidly worldwide in a short duration. It
caused a significant public health crisis worldwide, and by
the end of May 2020 (i.e., within the five months of its first
infection detection), over 6.16 million persons were infected,
and over 372 thousand have died [1]. Therefore, governments
worldwide seek solutions to minimize the infected cases from
the COVID-19 pandemic by employing mobile application
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based contact tracing [2], [3]. Mobile apps can help trace both
infected and suspected cases in almost real-time, and gov-
ernments are rushing towards developing and deploying such
applications and frameworks. However, several applications
raise significant privacy issues as they collect sensitive and
personally-identifiable data from users, and lack user control
and transparency in data processing or usage [2]–[5].
Governments are enforcing temporary lockdowns of cities to
slow down the spread of COVID-19, causing tremendous eco-
nomic losses. However, we can alleviate economic impact by
avoiding wide-scale lockdowns and performing more targeted
isolation. Therefore, introducing fog computing in economic
zones (e.g., shopping malls, organization buildings) can ensure
continued economic activities by alerting nearby people while
mobile computing (mobile apps) can help to trace the infected
and suspected cases. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no integrated fog computing framework alongside
contact tracing mobile apps that allows tracing community
transmission while preserving users’ data privacy. Therefore,
we introduce the following research questions to find an
appropriate solution to the cause.
Q1. Background and Issues: What are the issues and privacy
concerns in existing contact tracing apps?
Q2. Mobile and Fog Computing: How to utilize mobile and
fog computing to trace and prevent COVID-19 commu-
nity transmission?
Q3. Privacy-preserving Framework: How to develop an
automated privacy-preserving e-government framework?
We answer the first question by looking into the background
and issues of existing application frameworks as well as user
data privacy concerns (Section II). We find that there are
several mobile application frameworks developed by govern-
ments and third parties to trace the COVID-19 community
transmission. However, most of these applications and frame-
works have failed to ensure user data privacy and suffer from
other issues, such as mandatory use of apps, excessive data
gathering, questionable transparency of source codes and data
flow, unnecessary data usage or processing, and lack of user
control in data deletion.
We answer the second question by presenting the de-
sign considerations, architecture, and workflow of our e-
government application framework that utilizes mobile and fog
computing (Section III). The system consists of two types of
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Fig. 1: System Overview
fog nodes (ARC and SUDUN), several RESTful APIs, and a
central application. Users can register themselves using User
API. The ARC is used to check the risk of users visiting any
public places (e.g., shopping mall, organization building). Test
centers send the COVID-19 test results using Result API to the
central application. If the test result is positive, then the user is
requested to upload locally stored contact tracing information
to the cloud using SUDUN or directly from mobile app.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the proposed system.
We answer the third question by discussing the implementa-
tion overview and user data privacy solutions in our framework
(Section IV). Here, we discuss the framework development
based on the Amazon Web Services (AWS) solutions. Then
we present the privacy preservation based on user control (vol-
untary, compliance, and user consent), minimal data collection
(mobile number, postal code, and age group), data destruction
at user’s will, transparency (open source codes, clean data
flow), and limited further usage of data.
Scope: We intend our framework to be deployed and
controlled by the central government of a country. Govern-
ments have access to the test results and can control such
an integrated mobile-fog computing framework. Moreover,
relying on a private entity to manage such a framework can
limit the preservation of data privacy. Additionally, in this
work, we primarily consider and focus on user data privacy
issues. Regardless of building a standard and secure data
processing framework, we do not discuss advanced security
threats related to mobile, fog, and cloud layer as there are
rich literature on existing security measures [6]–[8].
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II introduces the privacy and general issues of ex-
isting contact tracing frameworks. Section III discusses the
design considerations, system components, and workflow of
our proposed e-government framework. Section IV presents
the implementation overview and privacy-oriented solutions
of the framework. Finally, Section V discusses a few related
privacy-preserving frameworks followed by a conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
Contact tracing and isolation of cases are required to control
infectious disease outbreaks, and the consequence depends
mainly on government actions and citizen responses [9].
Manual tracing is difficult and time-consuming in a pandemic
situation, and governments are pushing for digital surveillance
to contain the spread of the virus in the context of health
informatics [10]. However, these mobile apps have raised
questions over user data privacy since digital surveillance in-
volves location tracking, limits individual freedom, and expose
confidential data [5].
A. Contact Tracing
Governments can stop transmission of COVID-19 if they
identify cases and their contacts quickly and get them to
limit their connections with other people. Cases should isolate
themselves as long as they are infectious- for at least 10 days
after they became ill. Contacts must quarantine for 14 days
after the last contact with an infectious patient [11]. Some
cases may have close contact with many people because of
where they have been or where they live, and these situations
should immediately be reported.
Contact tracing might be difficult as an infected case may
not remember all people who came in their contacts. Addition-
ally, an infected person may not know or remember the phone
numbers and address of their contacts. It may take longer for
authorities as well due to the required time to identify and
get in touch with contacts. Therefore, mobile-based contact
tracing might help track several contacts and determine who
is at highest risk for infection.
Contact tracing usually requires three primary steps: contact
identification, listing, and follow-up [5]. People with contact
with an infected person are considered as suspected cases if
they were in proximal range for more than 15 minutes, within
6 feet [12] or the distance of more than 6 feet, but stayed
nearby for an hour [13].
3B. Contact Tracing Frameworks and Applications
Due to the necessity of tracing infected or suspected cases,
governments around the world have developed several tracing
applications and frameworks [4]. The most common features
of these applications are live maps and news updates of
confirmed cases, location-based tracking and alerts, quarantine
and isolation monitoring, direct or indirect reporting, self-
assessment, and COVID-19 education [2]. Some governments
involved third parties to develop such applications and encour-
aged citizens to use these applications.
1) Privacy Concerns: Since governments have been rush-
ing to build tracing applications, the least they have considered
about user data privacy. In most cases, users can be monitored
and tracked in real-time without users consent. If such mobile
applications store the location history, user movement can
be traced as well [14]. Apart from location tracking, there
are several other user privacy issues, such as excessive data
collection, obscure data flow, lack of user control, and data
usage policies.
Abeler et al. suggested that we can achieve contact tracing
and data protection at the same time by minimizing data
processing in the existing frameworks [15]. However, many
applications are not following such solutions and Howell et
al. has suggested five primary privacy concerns for COVID-
19 application frameworks [16].
• Voluntary or Mandatory: It should be a voluntary act
whether users download and use such tracing apps. With
the growing concern over data privacy, unnecessary data
collection, location tracking, and other issues, users must
have free wills to decide. The government or any third
party cannot mandate users to use these apps in any
circumstances.
• Data Usage Limitation: People are concerned over the
collected data usage for personal safety reasons [17].
Therefore, the collected data must have usage limitations.
For example, tracing data can only be used for public
health and safety. Traced data cannot be used for any
other purpose, e.g., law enforcement.
• Data Destruction: Mobile applications or a framework
should automatically delete user records after a particular
period [18] (e.g., usually 14-21 days and no longer than
30 days). Otherwise, users should have manual control
over data deletion from the app or the central server.
• Minimal Data Collection: Several applications collect
excessive, unnecessary data from its users, for example,
an application named “Aarogya Setu” requires name,
phone number, age, gender, profession, and details of
countries visited in the last 30 days. Also, Geo-location
tracing is unnecessary alongside Bluetooth or other sim-
ilar wireless technologies [19].
• Transparency: The entire process of data collection and
usage should be transparent to preserve user privacy.
Application frameworks should have publicly available
policies, clear and concise data flow and database, and
open-source codes for transparency. Additionally, users
should have full control over their data usage. Therefore,
developers must follow the compliance and consent rules
(GDPR, HIPAA, CCPA, etc.) strictly [18], [20].
Apart from the privacy issues mentioned above, there are
certainly other things to consider, as well. For example, the
mobile application generated IDs can be breached, decrypted,
and resulted in exposing user information. Additionally, appli-
cations controlled by the third party may pose a severe threat
as they can misuse the collected user data. Therefore, in terms
of privacy, user control over the owner’s data and transparency
are notable factors.
2) General Concerns: Apart from several data privacy
issues, different design issues are prevailing in the contact
tracing apps. Many applications require a constant internet
connection while it is entirely unnecessary. In some other
implementations, the user can not turn off the background
service of the apps, and these apps do not feature turn-off
option. The apps continue to work at random times, such as
while staying at home or sleeping. Therefore, it causes battery
drains too fast.
Tracing correctness depends on the distance and period of
contact. Several applications stores the RUERC of a nearby
user device even there is a wall between two persons. More-
over, rushing to develop such applications result in false posi-
tive suspected victim considerations and community transmis-
sion. Communication between multiple platforms may appear
troublesome and can lead to unexpected behavior. There-
fore, using Google/Apple API might be helpful to introduce
Bluetooth communication between two devices of different
platforms (Google Android and Apple iOS). Apart from these
issues, insecure source code, weak data flow and process, and
different Bluetooth-based device attacks can cause security
hazards.
3) Google/Apple Exposure Notification API: Google and
Apple announced their privacy-preserving exposure notifica-
tion in April 2020 and released phase one in May 2020 [21].
The API uses BLE technology and applies different hashing
algorithms to generate different keys on a specific time inter-
val [22] to prevent wireless tracking. Infected cases upload
only the daily generated keys of the past 14 days, and other
users download lists of these keys of infected cases of their
corresponding region.
All the key-generation and risk-level checks are performed
in the user’s mobile device, preserving user privacy. However,
this might also be a concern about the resource consumption
of that particular mobile device [23]. Moreover, as the user
is only uploading their keys, the authority can not notify the
contacts of the infected case immediately. Some other essential
functionalities, such as preventing community transmission
and identifying the asymptomatic spreaders, can also be trou-
blesome.
The responsibility of implementing this technology is on the
corresponding public health authorities. However, the authority
is required to follow the guidelines of privacy, security, and
data control rules as well as the development criteria such as
file and data format of storing, uploading, and downloading
4keys [21], [24]. This collaborative development of the Expo-
sure Notification ensures that both the platform (Android and
iOS) transmits and receive similar keys, and the risk level the
app calculates is also similar.
Current contact tracing apps backed by the governments
have numerous design and privacy issues due to the rush
for community transmission tracing. Regardless of addressing
existing issues, the question remains if the governments can
continue the economic activities alongside. Therefore, our
integrated mobile and fog computing-based framework can
solve the issues by effectively tracing community transmission
while organizations can run their economic activities.
III. FRAMEWORK DESIGN
Our proposed privacy-preserving e-government framework
has four major components: user mobile device and two
types of fog nodes (ARC and SUDUN), and a central cloud
application that integrates these nodes. Mobile Unit consists
of BLE, privacy dashboard, filter algorithm, file storage, and
communication service. A user mobile device advertises it’s
own RUERC, scans for RUERCs of other nearby devices, and
save the filtered RUERCs (see filtering Algorithm 1) in the
file storage.
Fog-based IoT-healthcare provides optimization of data
communication, low power-consumption, and improves effi-
ciency in terms of cost, network delay, and energy usage [25],
[26]. The BLE in the ARC and SUDUN advertises a specific
predefined UERC, and the mobile unit does not save these
UERCs to file storage. When the user is in proximity to ARC
(hospital, shopping malls, office), BLE of the ARC receives
all the RUERCs around, and the fog component checks if
there is any infected or suspected case. The cloud application
responds with a positive or negative result without disclosing
the victim’s identity. If there is a positive case, the ARC
transmits another predefined UERC that signifies the risk level
and alerts all the mobile units around, including the infected
or suspected case, hence preserving the victim’s privacy. The
other fog node, SUDUN, is set either in the test centers or
where the authority finds it necessary. When the mobile unit
receives the predefined UERC from this fog node, it checks its
privacy dashboard. If the privacy dashboard allows the mobile
unit to send the file to SUDUN, the mobile unit establishes
a connection with SUDUN and send the file. Then, the fog
component in SUDUN transfers the file to the corresponding
cloud. Here, Figure 2 presents the detailed workflow our
proposed integrated mobile and fog computing framework.
A. System Features
We introduce the following features of mobile application
and fog nodes in our integrated framework:
1) Contact Tracing: An user gets a hashed unique reference
code upon registration from the system. Every two hours,
another unique reference code is generated in the appli-
cation, which is being shared with nearby devices upon
user consent. It ensures that the broadcast data cannot be
used to trace an individual. The same hashed value will be
generated in the cloud application, and it can be used to
check the risk level of any individual without disclosing
his or her identity with others.
2) Self-checking: Users can check if he or she was nearby
any infected victim in the last 14 days using the mobile
application. The application will upload the locally stored
reference codes of the device it came in contact in the
last 14 days. The cloud application will check if any
of the uploaded RUERC is listed as an infected victim
or suspected victim. The application will notify the user
accordingly.
3) Minimum Mobile Computation: Our proposed framework
ensures minimum computation by enabling user control
to turn on or off scanning, and background services. Apart
from that, the mobile application features delay broadcast
by avoiding unnecessary frequency and requires mini-
mum internet connection as users only need internet while
registering and uploading data for self-check.
4) User Data Privacy: User personal data is not stored or
shared in the system. We ensure minimum data collection
and avoid user location tracking or digital surveillance.
Fog nodes do not identify any infected victim.
5) Fog Node Alerts: To minimize community transmission,
we introduce automatic risk checker in public places such
as shopping malls and office buildings. As there is a
chance of revealing the user identity, we introduce time
delay and minimum entry of people before broadcasting
simple alert messages. These messages only request users
to take precautions; do not reveal any RUERC or risk
radius.
B. System Components
Our framework has four major components: a mobile
application that broadcasts its RUERC, and stores received
RUERCs from nearby devices. The ARC checks for in-
fected cases and broadcast alerts in organization building.
The SUDUN uploads data from the device of infected cases.
Finally, a central cloud application integrates all these mobile
and fog nodes and manages collected data.
1) Mobile Application: Users download the application
from the google play store or govt server and install it in
the mobile device. The application broadcasts its RUERC
and receives RUERC of other devices around. It also detects
the special predefined UERC broadcasted by Automatic Risk
Checker (ARC) and alerts the user about an infected or
suspected case around.
2) Automatic Risk checker (IoT/Fog) (ARC): This fog de-
vice is set inside the hospital, shopping mall, educational in-
stitutes, and in all government-supervised organizations where
there is a possibility of community transmission. The fog can
receive the RUERC of the mobile devices within the Bluetooth
range and interacts with cloud service to detect any infected
or suspected victim. If any RUERC is found as an infected or
suspected victim, it broadcasts a specific UERC throughout the
place. The mobile application near the fog receives this spe-
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Fig. 2: Mobile and Fog Computing Framework for Tracing and Preventing Community Transmission
cific UERC and alerts the user about the risk. As the fog node
is registered via cloud fleet management service, the ARC
node can be monitored in real-time. Thus it allows identifying
any ARC node with a high rate of COVID-19 affected patient’s
presence. If the number of infected patients or the number
of suspected patients gets higher than a predefined maximum
threshold value per hour, it automatically generates emergency
alert service to the organization’s authority by sending emails
and messages. It informs the nearby health authorities as well.
The notification is broadcast only when there are at least 5
persons within the range of ARC to ensure the privacy of the
infected victim. On the contrary, the notification is not sent
instantly when the ARC identifies an infected or suspected
victim. It notifies the users after a certain period, which ensures
the identity of the infected or suspected victim is not disclosed
to others.
3) Suspected User Data Uploader Node (IoT/Fog)
(SUDUN): These fog nodes are similar to ARC and are set
at the health centers or the COVID-19 test centers. When a
test center reports a positive test result, the infected person
can voluntarily allow the application to enable uploading
its RUERC list from the privacy dashboard and keep the
mobile phone within the range of a SUDUN. A SUDUN
automatically connects with the user’s device and fetches the
list of stored lists of hashed RUERC from the device. Here,
we enable monitoring each SUDUN using a cloud dashboard
on a real-time basis. Additionally, the infected victim can
also upload the RUERC list by using the mobile application
and an internet connection without the help of a SUDUN.
4) Cloud/Server: The government provided secure data
storage and computing server. Receiving and storing data
from SUDUN, mining to predict essential patterns or super
spreaders, computing to provide required information to ARC,
and handling standard authentication to maintain security and
privacy are its primary responsibilities.
C. System Workflow
1) User Registration: Initially, users need to register in
the cloud using mobile number, age group, and postal code.
The mobile number field is mandatory; however, the age
group and postal code are optional. The Cloud Application
generates and sends a One Time Password(OTP) to the user-
submitted mobile number through SMS. Then the user enters
the OTP in the mobile application, and the app sends the OTP
to Cloud. The cloud application matches the user sent OTP,
with the generated one. If both matches, the cloud application
generates a UERC for the user and send it back to the user
installed mobile app. Finally, the mobile app stores the UERC
in encrypted format in the user device and then proceeds to
scan IDs broadcasted by other users. The user device itself
broadcasts a rotational UERC (derived from the initial UERC)
as well. Figure 3 presents the complete registration process.
2) Key Generation: Our framework generates Rotational
UERC (RUERC) with an interval of two hours. A person is
considered a suspect case if he stays nearby to an infected
person for an hour. As the RUERC changes every two hours,
possibly the users are supposed to receive more than one
RUERC if they stay nearby longer than an hour (e.g., in
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case they are neighbors). Our mobile application ensures that
even if a person comes in close at any minute, it will store
individual key and compare against the timestamp. It increases
the accuracy of finding contact without a rigorous need for
computation. Moreover, the RUERC enhances the privacy of
the user because always broadcasting the same UERC may
result in wireless tracking. While registering, the mobile unit
receives a UERC from the cloud, and from this UERC, it
generates RUERCs using the AES algorithm on each two-hour
interval for the next 14 days. When two devices come close,
they transmit and save these RUERCs. Figure 4 presents the
steps of RUERC generation.
3) RUERC Scan Service: Scan service allows the applica-
tion to run in the background. It creates a new thread so that
the user does not feel any obstacle while using other mobile
apps. The user has the privilege to stop and then restart running
the service at any time. Scanning and advertising RUERC,
creating files, and saving data are its primary responsibilities.
Scan service uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technol-
ogy to share RUERC between two mobile devices. The
BLE consumes significantly less power to communicate,
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control, and monitor IoT devices. It uses “central” and
“peripherals”, which define a network called piconet [27].
Central scans for the advertisement and peripheral makes the
advertisement. In our framework, the advertisement consists
of the defined RUERC. The Generic Attribute Profile (GATT)
is designed to send and receive short pieces of data known as
”attributes,” and it is built on Attribute Protocol (ATT), which
uses 128-bit unique ID [27]. In our framework, to maintain
the minimal data collection policy and preserve device power,
we are omitting the use of GATT and ATT. We are using
emphperipheral to transmit the RUERC and the central to scan
these RUERCs. While scanning, we filter these RUERCs with
our suspect filtering algorithm and save accordingly.
4) RSSI: The framework uses a Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI) to identify the distance between devices.
RSSI shows the strength of the received signal. It is calculated
in dB and depends on the power and chipset of the broad-
casting device. It also depends on the transmitting medium.
If there is any obstacle between the receiver and the sender,
the signal strength will decrease, so the RSSI. Therefore, for a
different manufacturer, the value of RSSI in a specific medium
shows different values. However, for a particular manufacturer,
RSSI shows the intensity of the signal strength. RSSI does not
provide the accurate distance but using path loss model [28],
an approximate distance can be found,
RSSI = −10 · n · log10(d) + C
Here, n is the path loss exponent that depends on the trans-
mitting medium, d is the distance, and C is a constant.
5) RUERC Storage in mobile device: To maintain user
privacy, the mobile application creates two files in the internal
storage of the mobile device. Even the user does not have
permission to access these files. When the peripheral receives
any signal, one file temporarily stores this signal information,
and other stores the information of the filtered signal. When
the device comes within the range of SUDUN, the signal
information of the filtered file is sent to SUDUN or directly
to the cloud to perform self-check.
6) Suspect Filtering: According to CDC, a distance of six
feet between the case and contact is safe to maintain [12]. A
person is considered a contact if he/she is within six feet for at
least fifteen minutes or is within the proximity for an hour [13].
The scan service scans all the RUERCs within the range of
Bluetooth. However, considering the rules mentioned above,
7continuous scanning is unnecessary as it causes battery and
memory consumption. Therefore, the scanning service scans
for 700ms with three minutes interval. We develop our suspect
filtering algorithm considering these factors so that the power
and memory consumption is minimal, and identifying suspects
is more accurate.
There are two types of files in the mobile device. One
contains all the signal information (RUERC, distance, and
timestamp) it receives from nearby devices on each interval.
If any received signal passes the filtering conditions, associate
information (RUERC, distance, timestamp, and duration) is
stored in another file. This file is called the final file and sent
to the cloud once the user is found COVID-19 positive. A
specific RUERC is stored in the final file only once a day.
Here, the suspect filtering algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
D. Data Processing
The framework is divided into three data processing layers
to preserve user privacy and restrict access to data in various
processes. Users can register to the system using a public
communication process via mobile application. In this same
access layer, the test centers can send the test results using
RESTful API services through HTTPs protocol. The users
can connect ARC and SUDUN fog node through the BLE
protocol and send data to fog nodes. The computation and
initial screening of user-uploaded data in fog nodes is done
in a protected network layer. The APIs which are consumed
by user mobile applications, test centers, and fog nodes are
also in this layer. The main data processor consisting of a set
of application nodes resides in a protected network, and users
cannot access the data processor directly. The processed data
is stored in data storage, which is configured in a restricted
private subnet. This subnet can only be accessed from the
ancestor private subnet, not from any public subnet. The data
layer is protected from SQL injection as it is not directly
connected through any user entries. Figure 5 displays the
process flow diagram.
IV. FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we discuss the implementation overview
of our framework with regards to Amazon Web Service.
Additionally, we discuss the database design, analysis of our
contact tracing graph, and our privacy-preserving solutions.
A. Implementation Overview
We have implemented our framework using Amazon Web
Services (AWS) [29], [30]. As it is a generic framework,
it can be applied in other IoT/Cloud platforms too. The
fog nodes, ARC and SUDUN, consist of AWS Greengrass
components and Lambda functions. They are connected to the
AWS IoT Core service using the MQ Telemetry Transport
(MQTT) protocol. The authenticity and security of the fog
nodes are ensured by using IoT Device Defender. IoT Device
Management service is used to monitor and audit the fog
Algorithm 1: Filtering suspected RUERC in mobile ap-
plication
/* TF = Temporary File, FF = Final File, */
/* Tc = Current Time, Tr = Registerd Time, */
/* T15 = 15 minutes, T60 = 60 Minutes, */
/* Dc = Current Distance, Dr = Registered
Distance, D = Standard Distance (6 Feet), Ct
= Contact, Cs = Case, ScSn = Scanned Signal,
RcSn = Recorded Signal in TF , */
/* ASU = ARC specific UERC, RSU = Risk specific
UERC, */
/* SSU = SUDUN specific UERC */
1 foreach Signal in RcSn do
2 if ScSn.contains(Signal) == false then
3 RcSn.remove(Signal)
4 foreach Signal in ScSn do
5 if Signal.RUERC == self.RUERC OR Signal.RUERC
== ASU then
6 return
7 if Signal.RUERC == RSU then
8 showRiskAlert() return
9 if Signal.RUERC == SSU then
10 sendFileToSUDUN() return
11 if RcSn.contains(Signal) == false then
12 RcSn.add(Signal)
13 else
14 Set Tc = Signal.time, Tr =
RcSn.get(Signal.RUERC).time, Dc =
Signal.distance, Dr =
RcSn.get(Signal.RUERC).distance
15 if Dc <= D AND Dr <= D then
16 if Tc − Tr >= T15 then
17 Ct = Signal
18 if (FF .contains(Ct) AND
FF .get(Ct).time.date ==
Ct.time.date) OR
isUserConsentToStoreData == false
then
19 return
20 FF .add(Ct)
21 else
22 Dr = Dc
23 else if Tc − Tr >= T60 then
24 Ct = Signal
25 if (FF .contains(Ct) AND
FF .get(Ct).time.date == Ct.time.date)
OR isUserConsentToStoreData == false
then
26 return
27 FF .add(Ct)
28 else
29 Dr = Dc
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Boundaries
nodes. Incoming data from the fog nodes are passed to Simple
Queue Service(SQS). The queue data is processed via Lambda
functions and moved into the application containers, which
is managed via the Kubernetes cluster within an auto-scaling
group for dynamic scaling of the master nodes and worker
nodes.
After the data is processed in the application nodes, it is
sent to the Redis Cache tier and eventually to the Amazon
Relational Database Service (RDS). For the administration
of the cloud application, an SSH connection is provided via
Elastic Load Balancing to a Bastion server. The users need to
be connected to the cloud application only on the registration
process via HTTPs connection to a load balancer. The test
centers send the test results using RESTful API over HTTPs.
The scheduled tasks, for example, generating the user’s rota-
tional UERC, is done in an Elastic Container Service, which
uses the CloudWatch event rule at a specific time of the day.
The application generates alarms for any irregular activities
like device connection error or access failure via Cloud-
Watch alarms to the proper authority. Users are notified from
ARC, SUDUN, and cloud application via Simple Notification
Service. For further communication processes to authorized
organizations and administrators, the Simple Email Service is
used. For restricting unauthorized access to the applications
and data layers, private subnets are used. To ensure efficient
data availability in the cloud, a database instance is stored
in a separate availability zone. Here, Figure 6 illustrates the
implementation overview.
B. Database
The cloud database includes several tables to trace infected
and suspected cases, to alert users, to prevent community
transmission in organizations through ARC, and collect test
results from SUDUN. The user table stores user registration
information (mobile number, age group, postcode, and times-
tamp) and the initial UERC. As we are generating new UERCs
associated with the primary user UERC, we need mapping in
between those unique reference codes. We store test results
(result ID, test organization ID, timestamp, test result, and user
mobile number) in a separate table and extract the infected
users (affected UERC, test result ID, and affected ID). Now,
we map between the registered user table and affected user
table to find out the suspected users and store the suspected
UERC, duration, timestamp, and distance radius alongside
generating a new suspect ID. We also need an organization
database where we store organization information (name,
email, geo-location, address.) and associated permissions for
ARC and SUDUN. Figure 7 presents the relations between all
these tables.
C. Contact Tracing Graph
To identify and trace COVID-19 community transmission,
we introduce and utilize a graph database called “Neo4j” [31]
to determine the contact graph. Figure 8 presents a portion of
the contact tracing graph with synthetic data of contact tracing.
The red, blue, and green circles indicate the test centers, users,
and test results. The lines present directed edges of the graph
between infected and suspected victims. The tracing graph
can be used to identify individuals who had come in close
contact with infected victims almost in real-time. We can
determine a potential super spreader as well, using the contact
tracing graph. Additionally, suspected victims identified by the
graph can be informed to take cautionary actions to prevent
community transmission.
D. Privacy Preservation
As we discussed five major data privacy issues earlier in
Section II, here, we discuss solutions to these issues in terms
of implementing our framework.
1) Voluntary: Users have full control over the usage of this
application and the stored data in the application storage. Even
it is an e-government framework, no one can force users to
use the mobile app, and the participation is voluntary. While
using the mobile application, users have a privacy dashboard
(Figure 9a) where he can allow if the app wants to store
collected RUERCs in the local storage, use device Bluetooth
to share user’s RUERC, and if the user wants to share the
collected RUERCs with the government.
2) Minimal Data Collection: Initially, the system collects
the user’s age group, postal code, and mobile number for
registration and, in return, provides a unique ID (UERC) to be
stored in a user’s mobile device. Then the mobile application
collects RUERC, timestamp, duration, and distance measure
9VPC
Availability Zone 1
Private subnet
Cloud
ARC
Users
Mobile
Device
Mobile
Device
Mobile
Device
Fog Node
Lambda Greengrass
BLE
BLE
BLE
Availability Zone 2
Private subnet
Users
Private subnet
DMZ Public Subnet
Auto Scaling group
Fog Node
SUDUN
Users
Mobile
Device
Mobile
Device
Mobile
Device
Lambda Greengrass
BLE
BLE
BLE
IoT Core
Device
Defender
Device
Management
MQTT
X.509
Certificate Queue
Lambda
Apps
Cache
Tier
Database
(primary)
Database
(standby)
CloudWatch
Alarms
Notifications
Emails
Load
Balancer
HTTPs
Test
Centers
HTTPs
Mobile
Application
SSH
Load
Balancer
Admin
Kubernetes
Cluster
BastionBLE
Mobile
Application
Scheduled
Tasks
Fig. 6: Implementation Overview with regards to AWS
Test_Results
test_result_idPK
test_organization_idFK
result_timestamp
test_result
mobile_number
Users
uercPK
age_group
postal_code
mobile_numberUNQ
added_at
Organization
organization_idPK
organization_type_idFK
parent_organization_idFK
name
email
phone
address
latitude
longitude
password
added_at
status
UERC_Mapper
mapper_idPK
user_uercFK
generated_uerc
Affected_Users
affected_idPK
affected_uercFK
test_result_idFK
Suspected_Users
suspection_idPK
affected_idFK
suspected_uercFK
added_by_organization_idFK
duration
connection_timestamp
distance
added_at
Organization_Types
organization_type_idPK
organization_type_title
Permissions
permission_idPK
permission_title
Organization_Permission
organization_permission_idPK
organization_type_idFK
permission_idFK
Fig. 7: The cloud database consisting of mandatory tables
(based on RSSI) from other mobile devices that came in
contact with the user’s device. Age group and postal code
are optional fields. These fields are used to define clusters
and identifying super spreaders. The phone number is used to
alert contact to take precautions. No personal information of
the user is collected during or after the registration procedure.
Figure 9b presents the mobile application user interface with
mandatory and non-mandatory fields.
3) Data Destruction: The mobile application deletes col-
lected RUERCs no later than 21 days calculated from the latest
timestamp. In the cloud application, UERC and associated
data from the suspected table is deleted in 30 days of entry
timestamp. Additionally, a user has full control over his
data and can delete it manually from the application storage
instantly. A user can also request for account deactivation and
deletion of data from the cloud database. However, it may take
up to two weeks to synchronize data in all replica databases.
4) Transparency: Transparency is vital in data privacy, and
governments should make the source codes open and publish
the user data flow in the whole framework. Transparency
motivates users to use an application and results in better
management and increased public engagement. Consent and
compliance can play a crucial role in presenting transparent
data processes and improving decision making.
5) Limited Data Usage: The collected data should have
limited use cases, and our framework opens the opportunity
to determine a super spreader, and clustered view of positive
cases. Additionally, the infected and suspected lists can help
calculate the risk factors in terms of community transmission.
However, while employing, further data usage should be
minimal, and users need to have a clear idea of why and how
data is being processed.
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Fig. 8: Contact tracing graph
V. RELATED WORK
Qiang Tang discussed a few existing privacy-preserving
framework solutions that attempted to solve several user
data privacy issues [32]. Author provided some observations
and privacy solutions on Singapore’s “Tracetogether”,
Reichert et al.s “MPC Solution” [33], Altuwaiyan et al.s
“Matching Solution” [34], and Vaudenay’s “DP3T” so-
lution [35].
Singapore’s Tracetogether: Affected users are compelled
to share with the Ministry of Health the locally saved in-
formation. In our framework, this is voluntary to share any
information with the system. Additionally, there is a risk of
decomposition of the app and collecting the geo-location data
from the app. As we are not storing any geo-location data
anywhere, this does not possess any risk of transpassing.
Reichert et al.s MPC Solution: This solution requires
the users smart device to be used to acquire and save geo-
location data, and this location trace is shared with the Health
Authority (HA) [33]. This may raise a privacy issue of the
users as it does not mention if they can preserve their privacy
by controlling what information they want to share with the
authority and what information they do not want to share. We
provide a clear and concise privacy dashboard to the users so
they can choose the information they want to share and alter
their choices. The solution does not consider the scalability of
computation of extensive data set collected from the devices,
and HA requires to arrange garbled circuits (a cryptographic
protocol that encrypts computation) for all infected users. We
take precautionary steps in fog nodes to filter the collected
data. Additionally, the central application uses an auto-scaling
technique and a queue service to facilitate the upcoming data.
Altuwaiyan et al.s Matching Solution: This solution uti-
lizes a privacy-preserving matching protocol between users
along with proper distance measuring procedure [34]. We are
using similar metrics to calculate the distance between mobile
devices. On the other hand, infected users’ exact location is
shared with the central server, which indicates severe privacy
violation. We do not use individual users locations and thus
preserve users location privacy.
The DP-3T Solution: The DP-3T solution provides a
privacy-aware framework while considering three design con-
siderations: low-cost design, unlinkable design, and hybrid
design. The solution takes advantage of the content delivery
network and provides a cost estimation per patient. Authors
discussed privacy concerns such as the social graph (social
relationships between users), interaction graph (physical in-
teraction nearby), location traceability (tracing individuals),
at-risk individuals (suspected cases), positive status (infected
cases), and exposed location (partial identification of places
a positive case visited). They also discussed the addressable
privacy concerns in terms of the three design considerations.
COVIDSafe: The app collects user name, phone number,
age-range, and postcode followed by the consent of the user
and sends to the server. The app stores encrypted user ID, time
of contact, and Bluetooth signal strength and keeps this data
for 21 days. The case can upload these data voluntarily [36].
The government has amended the Privacy Act 1988 to prevent
the misuse of these data [37]. The user can uninstall the app
to delete these data and to delete all data from the server, the
user needs to wait until the pandemic is over whereas, our
framework allows users to delete all data within 14 days.
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Fig. 9: Privacy Concerned Mobile Application User Interfaces
TABLE I: Comparison between Existing Solutions and Our Solution
Frameworks
Features Privacy-preserving Approaches Fog Computing Design Approaches
Volunatary
Data Usage
Limitation
Data
Destruction
Minimal Data
Collection
Transparency
Risk
Check
Infected/Suspected
Data Upload
Temporary
BLE ID
No Location
Tracking
Minimal
Internet Use
Tracetogether D D D D D x x D D D
MPC Solution D D x D x x x D D x
Matching Solution x D x x x x x D D D
DP-3T Solution D D D D D x x D D N/A
COVIDSafe D D D D x x x x D D
PPMF D D D D D D D D D D
Table I presents the difference between existing mobile ap-
plication frameworks and our integrated mobile-fog computing
framework (PPMF). Here, we categorize different features
in terms of privacy-preserving approaches (voluntary, data
usage limitation, data destruction, minimal data collection, and
transparency), fog-based integrated solutions (risk check, in-
fected/suspected data upload), and general design approaches
(temporary BLE IDs, no geo-location trace, and minimal
internet requirements). We put our framework (PPMF) at the
end of the list and find it ticks all these features.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have presented a mobile and fog
computing-based integrated framework that can trace and
prevent community transmissions alongside maintaining user
data privacy. In PPMF, we consider minimal data collection
and provide a temporary RUERC in encrypted form for storing
in user devices. The ARC is responsible for tracing positive
cases in public places and sending alerts to nearby people
without revealing the user’s identity. The SUDUN uploads data
to the central database about infected and suspected cases that
can be processed to identify a super spreader and visualize the
clusters of cases based on postal codes and age groups.
Minimal and undetectable data collection, user control,
and system transparency are essential factors to ensure user
data privacy. Privacy dashboard-based on compliance and
user consent makes it convenient and encourages citizens to
use such a user-friendly e-government framework. Therefore,
using the structure of our proposed PPMF framework, gov-
ernments can continue their economic activities while tracing
and minimizing the mass-level community transmission. In the
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future, we plan to develop a super spreader detection model
and clustering methodology of infected cases, based on our
framework.
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